Sunday, May 6, 2012

Asef Bayat, 2010. Life As Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East

Asef Bayat, 2010. Life As Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, Standford Univ. press.

Preface
This book is about the "art of presence," the story of agency in times of constraints. It is about "agency" and "change" in the Muslim Middle East, the societies in which religion seems to occupy a prominent position. It discusses "the diverse ways in which the ordinary people, the subaltern - the urban dispossessed, Muslim women, the globalizing youth, and other urban grass roots - strive to affect the contours of change in their societies, by refusing to exit from the social and political stage controlled by authoritarian states, moral authority, and neoliberal economies, discovering and generating new spaces within which they can voice their dissent and assert their presence of bettering their lives." (ix, 2010)

Albayat argues that the vehicles by which ordinary people change their societies are not simply audible mass protests or revolutions, even though they represent an aspect of popular mobilization; rather, - and this is Albayat's contribution, people resort to "nonmovements" (ix, 2010). Nonmovements are the collective endeavors of millions of noncollective actors, carried out in the main squares, back streets, courthouses, or communities (ix, 2010).

The book is divided into three uneven parts of 13 chapters.
Introduction
  • The Art of Presence
  • Transforming the Arab Middle East: Dissecting a Manifesto
Part 1: Social Nonmovements
  • The Quiet Encroachment of the Ordinary
  • The Poor and the Perpetual Pursuit of Life Chances
  • Feminism of Everyday Life
  • Reclaiming Youthfulness
  • The Politics of Fun
Part 2: Street Politics and the Political Street 
  • A Street Named "Revolution:
  • Does Radical Islam Have an Urban Ecology?
  • Everyday Cosmopolitanism
  • The "Arab Street"
  • Is there a Future for Islamic Revolutions?
Part 3: Prospects
  • No Silence, No Violence: Post-Islamist Trajectory




CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION:
THE ART OF PRESENCE


In this chapter alBayat begins with explaining the surreality of revolutions; "It is doubtful that revolutions can ever be planned. Even though revolutionaries do engage in plotting and preparing, revolutions do not necessarily result from prior schemes. Rather, they often follow their own intriguing logic, subject to a highly complex mix of structural, internationa, coincidental, and psychological factors... revolutions are never predictable." (2) In his end notes, alBayat refers to Rod Aya who focuses on the analysis of "revolutionary situations" instead of projecting revolutions in retrospect. See Rod Aya, "Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence," Theory and Society 8, no. 1 (July 1979) pp. 39-99.



Under political constraints, people allude to nonviolent strategy of reform that requires 1)powerful social forces - social movements (of workers, the poor, women, youth, students, and broader democracy movements) or 2) genuine political parties - to challenge political authorities and hegemonize their claims (2). Such approach requires "organized activism" hard to achieve under intolerant authoritarian regimes.


Mainstream Middle Eastern research scholars and think tanks often envisioned "change" to come through a "realistic solution" of a "western-supported project of gradual and moderate reform aiming at liberalization" (3). This idea of Middle Eastern "exceptionalism" accompanied by mainstream orientalism depicted the "Muslim Middle East as a monolithic, fundamentally static, and thus "peculiar" entity. By forcusing on a narrow notion of (a rather static) culture - one that is virtually equated with the religion of Islam- Middle Eastern societies are characterized more in terms of historical continuity than in terms of change. In this perspective, change, albeit uncommon, may indeed occur, but primarily via individual elites, military men, or wars and external powers." (3)This was the impetus of George W.Bush administration's doctrine of "regime change," exemplified in, for instance, the occupation of Iraq and the inclination to wage a war against Iran, represents how, in such a perspective, "reform" is to be realized in the region.... AlBayat's critique to that meta narrative of Middle Eastern "exceptionalism" is that it overlooks internal sources of political transformation, such as group interests, social movements, and political economies (3).

 AlBayat points out to the flaws of ascribing and borrowing social movement theory models to reflect on Islamic activism, rather than looking at its local nuances and what it might contribute in is own terms. That's why he is introducing the term "social nonmovements."


To understand the western genealogy of "social movements," Tilly analyzes its historical specificity, the political performances that emerged in Western Euope and North America after 1750. In this historical experience, what came to be known as "social movements" combined three elements: (for further reference look at Charles Tilly, "Social Movements," 2009)
  1. an organized and sustained claim making on target authorities;
  2. a repertoire of performances, including associations, public meetings, media statements, and street marches;
  3. public representations of the cause's worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment." (4)
But these attributes don't adequately fit the mode of operation of social movements in the Middle East and especially the Arab spring uprisings. First the use of advanced technologies of Facebook and twitter that gave an alternative medium of communication in the virtual space after the censorship of the physical space. Second, according to alBayat; "the process of "solidarity building" or the collectivities of "disjointed yet parallel practices of noncollective actors" in the non-western politically closed and technologically limited settings." Here I argue that the "Egyptian grassroots movements" attains the highest record of tweeting and facebooking, building capabilities to be savvy enough to oust Mubarak, not fully, but at least partially. There is a limitation to this as, only six million Egyptians have internet access from a population of 85 million, yet that was enough to mobilize in the streets.



The Orientalist perspective of ashwaiyyat:
"For instance, considering "slums" in light of the conventional perspective of urban sociology, the informal communities in the Middle East (i.e. ashwaiyyat) are erroneously taken to be the breeding ground for violence, crime, anomie, extremism, and, consequently, radical Islam. There is little in such narratives that sees these communities as a significant locus of struggle for (urban) citizenship and transformation in urban configuation. Scant attention is given to how the urban disenfranchised, through their quiet and unassuming daily struggles, refigure new life and communities for themselves and different urban realities on the ground in the Middle Eastern cities. The prevailing scholarship ignores the fact that these urban subaltern redefine the meaning of urban management and de facto participate in determining its destiny; and they do so not through formal institutional channels, from which they are largely excluded, but through direct actions in the very zones of exclusion." (5)








 

























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